Fructivore Investments

I was discussing value investing on a forum I frequent, and an objection someone raised to value investing is that everything that is knowable about a company is rapidly processed and analyzed by people who are smarter than you and have larger resources and bigger staffs. In other words, that markets are efficient, although he didn’t just come out and say that.

I take the position that you don’t need insider information or to find news faster than the other guy in order to gather excess returns. In fact, that sort of thinking is a detriment, since value investing is not a matter of knowing what other people don’t know, so much as it is caring about what other people don’t care about. For example, hardly anyone should care about whether a stock’s earnings for one quarter are a few pennies higher or lower than some analyst believes, and yet stocks gyrate hugely on earnings day because of it. In another example, Windstream commonly appears on Motley Fool and other places as a company that pays too many dividends and is destined for a cut, but most analysts neglect to consider that on top of $330 million in earnings are $240 million in excess depreciation charges, which more than covers $437 million in dividends.

Sometimes it is the complexity of a situation that scares people off; Seth Klarman in Margin of Safety describes a situation where a company was being bought out for either $17 per share in cash or $3 in 12.5% one year notes, $10 in 12.5% fifteen-year notes, 0.2 shares of the acquirer’s preferred stock, and 0.6 warrants for the acquirer’s common stock at one penny a share, but only 57.5% of the shareholders could take the cash option; otherwise the cash would have to be prorated. Unsurprisingly, Klarman would have taken the money, but the point is that after the Crash of 87 the company was selling for $10 a share, so any investor who was not scared off by complexity would do very well by it (in fact, 57.5% of $17 is $9.775, so as long as the rest of the package was worth more than a quarter the alert investor would have done just fine. In other cases, it can be distress; Bon-Ton’s bonds at one point sold for 11 cents on the dollar over bankruptcy fears, despite the fact that based on earnings power the company was worth about $1 billion dollars capitalized at 10%, and there was only $600 million in senior debt ahead of them, so a $400 million bond issue that was looking at $400 million in remaining enterprise value was available for $44 million. But one whiff of the word “bankruptcy” (in the first quarter of 2009 when Bon-Ton would have had plenty of good company in the bankruptcy court) was enough to send investors reeling. And what has happened now? The firm has announced that it foresees a return to profitability next year and the bonds trade virtually at par.

For another example, Conn’s Inc. (CONN) is a retailer in the Texas area that does in-house financing for qualifying customers. Much attention has been paid to the fact that the firm’s receivables have been building up on its balance sheet from almost nothing two years ago to around $200 million today. Normally a buildup of unpaid receivables is associated with weakness, and that is exactly what the tenor of many articles about Conn’s has been. However, they are overlooking the fact that before two years ago Conn’s securitized all its receivables, but the decline in interest in that market coupled with dropping interest rates has allowed Conn’s to secure a line of credit that carries a lower cost of funds than the securitization for at least a portion of its receivables. The only catch is that Conn’s, rather than the financing subsidiary, is the name on the line of credit so their receivables are now on balance sheet rather than the off-balance sheet financing entity. If you look at the sum of the receivables held by Conn’s and the financing subsidiary combined, the total has hardly increased at all over the last couple of years, and that is what people are missing and what, presumably has caused the share price to decline below its net-net working capital. They have also recently concluded an amendment to their line of credit to obtain more breathing space in the face of rising chargeoffs, which is another plus (the amendment, not the chargeoffs themselves).

So, if you have a stock you’re following, and you keep notice that articles about that stock seem to focus on one thing, investigate all the things that are not reported. You might be surprised at what you find.

The SEC, naturally embarrassed about letting Bernie Madoff get away with it for a mere 14 years, has taken to putting press releases on its homepage announcing their upcoming securities fraud actions. This  one, though, is particularly good.

SEC Charges Nationally Known Psychic in Multi-Million Dollar Securities Fraud

Now, securities fraud violations are like potato chips; you can’t commit just one. The complaint alleges that the psychic Mr. Morton did not invest all of his funds the way he said he would in his solicitations, including diverting money to his personal religious organization. However, the press release also alleges that “Morton made numerous materially false representations relating to his psychic abilities,” and the director of the SEC’s New York office added “Morton’s self-proclaimed psychic powers were nothing more than a scam to attract investors and steal their money.”

Of course, if this goes to trial the SEC will have to prove that the claims Mr. Morton made are materially false, meaning that they will have to prove in court that he is not a psychic, which I would really like to see.

But not all psychics in the market bill themselves as such. The Elliot Wave people trying to predict the time of the next grand supercycle have no better claims than Mr. Morton in predictive ability. The quantitative analysts who provided ratings agencies cover to give subprime CDO tranches investment grade ratings are no better than Mr. Morton; they’re just better at math (and allegedly better at not embezzling). They essentially make the same psychic claims, but because they call it econometrics instead of psychic abilities, they get away with it.

The lesson we should take from this is that deterministic prediction is more or less useless; by deterministic prediction, I mean saying “This is what will happen,” as opposed to “this is probably what will happen,” or ideally “this is the set of what could happen, do what you will.”

It puts me in mind of these endless histrionic circular debates about the shape of the recovery. “Will it be a V shaped recovery?” “Will it be a W shaped recovery?” “Will it be an L shaped recovery?” “Will we invent time travel and make it an O shaped recovery?” The correct answer is that it will be a ? shaped recovery until further notice.

So stick with an investment strategy that has stood the test of time. Stick with value investing.

Some of my more loyal reader(s) will recall that one of the very first stocks I suggested on our site was Qwest, on the grounds that it had on the order of $750 million in depreciation expenses that was not being made up for with additional capital expenditures. Considering that the firm has a P/E ratio of about 12 without the excess depreciation added back in, it is pretty clear that the market is ignoring it, since $750 million in added depreciation more than doubles Qwest’s earnings.

Of course, eventually depreciation and capital expenditures should reach a steady state, but until then excessive depreciation is free money (the technical term is “free cash flow”), and Qwest has to find something to do with the extra cash while it lasts. On the one hand they could think offensively, deciding to modernize, move into the high-premium, growth areas of the telecom market in order to combat line loss, or they could think defensively. The only thing they should not do is not think at all and keep the cash on hand earning a ridiculously low return until the CEO decides he needs to redecorate the executive suite.

Instead of buying $6000 shower curtains, Qwest has actually chosen the defensive route of announcing a bond buyback. They are attempting to retire early two debt issues that mature this year and next year, which carry interest of 7.9% and 7.25%, before taxes.  I suppose it is better than earning less than 1% before taxes by holding cash, and also produces some deleveraging. Of course, utilities have stable operations and are allowed to hold a lot of debt; Windstream has an interest coverage ratio of 2.33, which is considered dangerously low for a non-utility. Qwest’s coverage ratio is 1.81, so the need to deleverage might be a little more pressing.

But at the same time their pretax operating profits, with the additional depreciation, come to 2.75 billion, which given their 20.38 billion in total assets is  a 13% profit margin, which is why I am suggesting that they should purchase a valuable business instead, but this calculation is itself complicated by the possibility that accelerated depreciation has caused their asset value on the books to be below their actual economic value.

But I think the deciding factor is that the company will shortly have to pay the bonds back within a year or two at any rate, and keeping the money hanging around on the balance sheet until then is going to cost them a great deal of money. And at any rate, paying down debt early saves them interest and also frees up their borrowing capacity until they decide to do a leverage-based expansion.

So this buyback does increase the firm’s flexibility and on those grounds it is defensible, even if in terms of cost of capital or defensive saving versus expansion decisions. Of course, the other alternative is a big fat special dividend, but the company may in fact be afraid of where interest rates are going to be by the time they have to roll their debts over.  And not everyone has the same sanguine notions of inflation that I do.

Poe said that the best place to hide something is in plain sight, and Peter Lynch suggested in his One Up on Wall Street that the reader’s own consumption patterns could provide a source of candidate companies. And, in keeping with our theme, we should give consideration to a company that sells fruit.

Chiquita Brands is best known for its bananas, which compose about 60% of its total sales, although 2/3 of their bananas go to Europe. The balance of their sales is other produce, healthy snacks, and prepackaged salads, which the company refers to in its SEC filings with the transparently corporate name of “value added salads”.

Chiquita’s 2008 results were dragged down by a good-will writeoff and a discontinued product line, but setting the write-off aside as nonrecurring, we find that the firm had earnings of $50 million last year, and YTD their earnings are $117 million. The company claims that most of its earnings come from the first and second quarters, and since the 4th quarter results have not come in, we may accept $117 million as roughly the earnings for the year. Furthermore, depreciation has exceeded capital expenditures by about $10 million in the last couple of years. This translates to a P/E ratio of about 6.

Banana farming is a labor-intensive process, and shipping them requires refrigerated cargo ships. Chiquita claims to have hedges to address an increase in the cost of shipping, but it observed in its latest 10-Q that banana prices in North America did not decline alongside the lower cost of shipping, although volume did slightly increase. Since export bananas are primarily grown in the tropics, it stands to reason that all banana exporters are in the same banana boat as far as fuel costs.

There is, though, a strain of soil fungus called Fusarium, which has decimated the export bananas in Southeast Asia, and many people theorize that it is only a matter of time before it hits Chiquita’s plantations in Latin America, a fate that we have already narrowly avoided because the DEA was considering using it to eradicate cocaine plantations.  If that happens, of course, all bets are off. Even if the value-added salads are profitable, the jingle “I’m a value-added salad and I’ve come to say…” doesn’t quite have the same ring to it.

According to wikipedia, Chiquita has been fined by the government for paying off Colombian militias which the US government considers terrorists but which Chiquita considers as just gangsters running a protection racket. Furthermore, a French NGO claims that Chiquita’s field workers in Costa Rica are treated abominably, including pesticide exposure and using a gang of thugs to intimidate them. So, investors who believe in socially responsible investing should look elsewhere. But some of us have learned from the examples of Microsoft, Phillip Morris, and Halliburton that there is definitely an “evil premium”, and so investors can possibly overlook this too.

So, to review, Chiquita Brands: cheap but evil.

Update 2/23: It would seem that the firm has managed to lose money in the 4th quarter, although not enough to erase that much in profits from earlier in the year. Full year earnings are about $2 a share, which would put my estimated P/E ratio at about 7.5, although with the recent price action 7 even is available.

Some of you may recognize our old friend Hoggy the Yield Hog over there, whom I last mentioned in the context of Breitburn Energy. I took the position that colossal plunge in unit price since the partnership announced that it was suspending distributions was entirely unjustified. The partnership was still making money; it was just using it to pay down debt instead of giving it to shareholders, and although this does indicate that the company was in debt trouble, the debt after the announcement was the same as the debt before the announcement and on its way down, so this cannot be blamed on distress.

The issue of dividends is sharply divided; Modigliani and Miller claim to have proved that a firm’s dividend yield is irrelevant to its value, but the non-academics of the world know that a dollar distributed via dividends is a dollar that the CEO can’t think of a way to waste. A distribution is particularly important for Breitburn because it is a partnership, and the key thing about partnerships under U.S. tax law is that the partners are taxed on their share of partnership income, whether or not that income is actually distributed to them. Better than double taxation, I suppose.

But if you were following the news lately, you will note that Breitburn is in fact resuming its distributions, causing the price to rise by about 11% when the announcement was made (and also settling a lawsuit where they inexplicably decided to stop their largest shareholder from voting for a general partner). The distribution was set at $1.50 a year, which is lower than the $2.52 a year that was their last distribution before they stopped. The price seems to have pinned itself to yield 10%, just as Linn Energy has. I’m not sure what the 10% magic is, although both firms hedge their production years in advance so they probably do have a yield in mind to remain competitive. And the high it made yesterday is only a little bit higher than the high they made a couple days before the announcement.

But this is encouraging. Perhaps more of our target companies can return to normal operations soon too.

They do say that small cap companies, which are not commonly followed by Wall Street analysts or even portfolio managers for a variety of economic reasons, are a fertile hunting ground for underpriced stocks. Although this effect has somewhat diminished since it was discovered, as most facts on Wall Street inevitably are (apart from the success of value investing itself, of course), it is generally the case that the more interest there is in a particular class of assets, the more efficient the price becomes. For an exception to this rule, see the pricing of subprime mortgage derivatives.

I have also been considering foreign stocks in the same light; the United States financial system is widely considered the most robust in the world, and as such we are very good at sniffing out wrong prices. It therefore follows that in foreign nations the markets are less efficient and therefore riper grounds for opportunities. Of course, a lot of this could spring from the possibly low state of development of overseas capital markets and accounting/financial reporting rules.

At any rate, there are problems with investing in small companies, primarily having to do with how easy it is to distort prices with smaller orders. My favorite stock screener includes many stocks that have market caps of under $50 million and several stocks that have days where not a single share is traded, at least on the U.S. exchange. One such stock is a quirky little company called Jewett Cameron (JCTCF), which operates in British Columbia but apparently reports in American, and for which at current prices $14 million would buy the entire company.

And $14 million probably should buy the entire company, although it would have to go to Canada to buy a lot of the shares. Despite its small size, the firm has four operating segments: industrial wood products; lawn, garden, pet, and other; seed processing and sales; and industrial tools and clamps. Sales have been declining lately, largely as a result of a sharp decline in the industrial wood products division due to the slowness of the boating industry. The firm has also had to write down a large amount of its grass seed inventory last quarter as a result of slowness in demand from new homes and golf courses, which are apparently two large users of grass. Nonetheless, the firm remained profitable last quarter despite this large writedown and the seasonal slowdown in its business. Based on historical earnings power, the firm trades at a price/earnings power of 7, although if the boating market does not recover and the firm can find no alternate use for its boating-grade wood, historical earnings power may not be useful as a permanent guide.

On the balance sheet side, the firm has in current assets $7.6 million in cash, $2.2 million in receivables, and $6.8 million in inventory, total $16.9 million. There are an additional $909 thousand in liabilities, making this stock positive on a net-net working capital basis, although a large inventory writeoff would put that situation at risk. The firm’s overall price/book ratio is 0.79, and its large cash position suggests that their return on noncash assets is attractive; I estimate it at a pretty decent 11%.

So, Jewett Cameron is a stock worth considering in the (very) small cap arena. Just make sure you buy slowly and carefully.

I was reading a book about structured finance lately, which talked about the enormous advances that have been made in leasing. It is possible, through these companies and their special purpose entities to arrange the leasing of an entire factory and its contents, for years, without recording any of it as a liability or, worse, actually spending money and putting it on the balance sheet. In fact, the latest refinement in this area is that the lessor company itself borrows the money that it uses to buy the leased property, thus allowing it to claim the tax benefits of depreciation while the bulk of the lease income can presumably be hidden offshore.

Well, the stock I have to discuss does none of those things. Microfinancial (MFI) is a finance company that deals in leasing of business equipment for fairly small amounts ($5500 on average) for the benefit of their clients who find that leasing is more effective than selling their products. So, in the above example they would be the offshore lease income receiver, although they are actually onshore.

The business has decent return on capital lately, although writeoffs have been taking their toll last year. Their P/E ratio YTD is about 12, and for 2008’s earnings it would have been 7 1/2.  The firm pays a dividend of about 7%. As the economy improves and the writeoff situation improves with it, it is likely that the firm can return to its former huge profitability, and the firm has $33 million, which is more than half of its market cap, available on its line of credit to see it through to that happy point. Furthermore, the firm has a price/book ratio of 0.63, meaning that at this price investors can purchase the leases for less than the company paid for them.

There is one more thing I have to address. I don’t like to get political, but I couldn’t let the recent decision by the Supreme Court that corporations have the freedom of speech right to spend unlimited amounts of money out of their own budgets to make campaign advertisements. This is in my view and in the views of many people the largest step, and the last step necessary, to turn the United States into a corporatocracy. Ratings agencies have used their supposed freedom of speech rights to evade responsibility for giving AAA ratings to poisoned CDOs, but this is much more sinister.

It seems to me that it is wholly anathema to freedom of speech that the more money you have, the more speech you get, and the entire line of cases that has established that corporations are entitled to the rights of citizenship has worried me. Since Obama and McCain have both blasted this decision, and it can be attacked from progressive and even Tea-bagging grounds as well, it seems to me that this is not a matter of left versus right, but a matter of left and right and bottom against the top.

It is time for a Constitutional amendment disapproving of granting corporations 14th amendment rights, and there is a more pressing and immediate need for such an amendment than any other possible amendment. I urge all concerned Americans to contact the President and their representatives in Congress (not the Supreme Court itself; they don’t care) calling for measures in response to this.

One proposal I have heard though, short of an amendment, is a rule requiring shareholder approval before any such money is spent. Although they were not clear on the details, it seems to me that this rule is virtually mandated if corporations get free speech rights; after all, corporations are the instruments of their shareholders and so if corporations are making a speech that the shareholders disagree with, then shareholders are effectively forced into making a speech that they disagree with. And if denial of free speech is a major violation of the First Amendment, forcing someone to engage in speech is an equal violation (there are cases on this point).

Accordingly, short of a Constitutional amendment (which is a good idea with or without this decision), the effect of the Court’s could be blunted, in a manner entirely consistent with freedom of speech, by requiring the unanimous approval of all shareholders before the corporation engages in this politicizing. Anything less forces the dissenting shareholders into making an involuntary speech, and that is definitely verboten.

I think I’ll write that suggestion in to Congress and the President as well.

I recently purchased Value Investing by Montier. It’s an interesting book, but it seems to focus more on behavioral finance issues and value investing philosophy than actual techniques. Now, of course, no one describes their investing style as “behavioral finance,” but to a large degree every investment philosophy depends on exploiting some mistake that most investors make so although it’s not all you need to understand to invest, it is something you need to understand. Since the techniques of value investing were invented decades ago and have not really changed much, the book’s focus is fine. It never hurts for value investors to read a well-written book that allows us to renew our smugness; we feel comforted knowing that the great titans of Wall Street are still capable of being outmatched by a little guy who’s capable of remembering that 2+2=4 (but sometimes you can buy it for 3 anyway).

Actually, as to that example, in his multi-part debunking of the efficient market hypothesis he even goes after the well-known statistic that mutual funds generally do not beat the market over long periods. First of all, he explains that mutual funds fail to beat the target index because most of the time they purchase the target index for most of their portfolio to avoid lagging behind. In fact, one bold and daring mutual fund manager was apparently forced by his company to dilute his good ideas with a premade portfolio to better replicate the index. The author’s own study revealed that over a period where good mutual funds earned 12% a year, which was the index average, if you instead considered the managers’ best ideas, as estimated by their largest positions, they managed to pull off 19% a year over the same period. So, the much touted inability of fund managers to beat the market is the fault of the fund management business, not the inability of the parties involved.

John Nash, founder of game theory

He also describes a nifty game that was played at a conference he attended. All the parties guess a number from 0 to 100, and the winner is the one who guesses the number that is 2/3 of the average of the guesses. He describes first that since the winning answer can never be above 67, and that only applies if everyone else guesses 100, he was kind of surprised that there were answers above 67.

There was a small cluster of answers at 50, which he calls “0-level thinking.” So, an answer around 33 would be “1-level thinking” because it assumes that the average guess would be 50, and so 22 I guess would be “2-level thinking.” There was a large cluster of answers around 0 and 1 (perhaps owing to some confusion about whether 0 was a legal answer), and the author noted “these would be the game theorists and the quants.” He is correct that the answer of 0 is “n-level thinking” where n is a decently large number, because if everyone thinks the situation out and pursues optimum strategy 0 is the correct answer. But the actual answer was 17 because the average was 26 (and he concludes that the average professional investor employs 1.6 level thinking, since 50 * (2/3)^1.6 is 26).

But I want to focus on the people who voted higher than 67. He thought it was owing to some confusion about how the game worked, but I think it was just some people who wanted to annoy the game theorists and their fancy book-larnin’. Since only 3 people got the right answer (out of 1000 players and with only 68 “real” answers available, so they actually did worse than a random guess), it is possible that people played to enjoy the game rather than to win. My friend Mike adopts a similar approach to the game of Fluxx; instead of playing to win he tries to play so that the game will last forever, which is not difficult. I think that the people who voted above 67 were just trying to block the game theorists and their optimum strategizing.

I know I would.

I have spoken highly in the past of a stock selling for less than its net working capital with the additional criterion that the firm be profitable. On top of the attractiveness of the stock recovering at least to its asset value, the net working capital level serves as a price floor, thus reducing the risk of holding the company. As a result, the investor should be theoretically able to lower their required return on capital to go with the reduced risk, since a risk-free investment that can beat the risk-free rate is in a theoretical sense just as good as an ordinary equity investment that beats the ordinary return on equity.

Of course, I am skeptical of theoretical finance, but value investors agree that the way to make money from investing is simply to avoid losing it. And as a result, if the stock is already trading at or near its price floor and is profitable, the stock is at least a candidate for purchase. However it is normally a run of losses that depresses investor sentiment to the point where the stock is pushed towards or below its net working capital in the first place, so instead of currently profitable, potentially profitable would be a better test (of course, Key Tronic was always profitable, but it takes more than one stock to fill in a portfolio). When the company does return to profitability, the price should appreciate to bring return on assets in line with asset prices.

For example, Coast Distribution Systems (CRV) is a wholesaler of replacement parts for recreational vehicles and boats, and naturally with the slowing economy interest in boating and recreation has gone down. On the one hand, boats and recreational vehicles are expensive and it is more likely that owners keep their existing vehicles going longer, but on the other hand they might be abandoning this expensive hobby entirely, and even if they did not sales of new boats and RVs are going to be depressed, which will affect the market for parts for some time.

However, CRV has adapted to this situation by dramatically cutting their operating expenses, from around $27 million a year in previous years to $20.1 million in the last four quarters, and a mere $4.7 million in the last quarter reported. Of course, there is a limit to how far costs can be cut, but the firm has been profitable for the last two quarters as a result, despite sales dropping by nearly half since 2006. So, if the firm does find its feet again on its present operating scale, as it appears to be doing, there should be no little further erosion of the stockholder’s equity.

And the equity itself, according to the balance sheet, is $30.6 million against a current market cap of $17.4 million. Furthermore, the current assets, cash, receivables, and inventory, count for all but $5 million of this amount, so even if there is some erosion of current asset values the stock is selling for below the stock’s theoretical minimum value, so there is ample room for appreciation.

So, again, stocks with a built-in asset value floor that is higher than the current stock price are a good idea if they are now, or can be expected to be profitable under reasonable, not particularly optimistic assumptions.

A great deal of value investing is the process of elimination. Warren Buffett, when asked how he finds undervalued stocks, simply replied “Start with the A’s.” But in most markets only a small fraction of securities count as underpriced on an absolute basis, so value investing requires wading through an endless sea of crap in search of the delicious low-hanging fruit (yes, in this example fruit comes from the sea). Given my affinity for this mode of investing, how could I not like Ross Stores (ROST)?

Ross Stores is a discount retailer that sells clothing and home accessories, and gathers much of its apparel through sniping manufacturer overruns and cancelled orders, much as investors would do if they want something on sale. This strategy can acquire some highly desirable and serviceable clothing, but much of Ross’s purchases are not in demand for a good reason (lime green pants, anyone?). How could a value investor not like this business model? For people who like the thrill of the hunt aspect of shopping it creates a fine shopping experience.

As you may imagine, Ross has been doing very well at luring customers during a recession. They are on pace to earn $400 million this year, when normally they earn somewhere in the $300 million range. This ability to do well in a recession reminds me of Rayonier or Compass Minerals. I discussed Rayonier as an inflation hedge, with the advantage over gold and TIPS that they can produce a decent return even without inflation. Upon reflection, I believe that Compass Minerals offers the same advantage from its salt and fertilizer. Road salt is a widely used de-icer and is vital in regions that are not so environmentally concerned as to adopt calcium or magnesium chloride, and fertilizer is similarly impossible to do without, so I am convinced that Compass Minerals is also good for an inflationary situation.

Ross is not a hedge against inflation, but the fact that its sales increase when the economy weakens and sales everywhere else tend to decrease, makes it a useful hedge against an economic downturn. Even after this growth, Ross trades at a P/E ratio of 13.6, which has actually been trending down of late. Thus, it does not really produce outsize returns, but its robustness in a recession is attractive. I normally prefer an earnings multiplier of about 10, because I try to avoid overpaying for growth, which often translates to “I try to avoid paying for growth,” and if I can usually find 10 anyway, why depart from it? In fact, if we go by Ross’s more typical historical earnings, at current prices Ross would have a P/E ratio of 18. However, I do feel that Ross is entitled to some premium from its ability to hedge against a downturn, and since they have been opening new stores all the while, at least some of the expansion of sales is here to stay, and not just the temporary influence of thrift.

I should mention, though, that Ross uses share buybacks instead of raising its dividend, and I  wish they would declare a dividend and be done with it, since it suggests a greater degree of stability and permits all shareholders to benefit immediately from positive cash flows. Certainly a share buyback concentrates the effect of future earnings, but existing earnings have to count for something too.

So, I am convinced that Ross is one of those great companies at a good price that Warren Buffett talks about, but, like Graham, I have always been suspicious of the view that if you get a good quality stock the price will take care of itself (I’ve always thought the reverse was more accurate), and at any rate, the time to hedge against a recession is over; one’s already here. Nonetheless, this king of discount stores comes with a built-in put option on the rest of the economy and should be entitled to a premium for it. And despite what the regulators would have you believe, this is not the last recession we’re ever going to have.